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ABSTRACT
In Lying and Insincerity, Andreas Stokke argues that bald-faced lies are genuine
lies, and that lies are always assertions. Since bald-faced lies seem not to be
aimed at convincing addressees of their contents, Stokke concludes that
assertions needn’t have this aim. This conflicts with a traditional version of
intentionalism, originally due to Grice, on which asserting something is a
matter of communicatively intending for one’s addressee to believe it. I argue
that Stokke’s own account of bald-faced lies faces serious problems and give
several responses on behalf of intentionalism. Some bald-faced lies are best
understood as irrational attempts to deceive. Others are best understood as
indirect speech acts of various kinds. Still, others are best understood as
conventional speech acts, which differ from communicative acts like assertion
in the ways that they must be embedded in social institutions or practices. An
overarching theme of this essay is that we should not make theoretical
decisions about how to classify speech acts by consulting ordinary usage.
KEYWORDS lying; bald-faced lies; Grice; intentionalism; speech acts
What is it to lie, or to be otherwise insincere? In Lying and Insincerity,
Andreas Stokke defends detailed answers to these questions, but he
also does much more than this. The answers that he defends are
embedded in a broader theory of language use, and the answers that
he rejects are embedded in rival pragmatic theories of their own. Stokke
therefore treats his central topic as one battlefield on which larger dis-
putes over the nature of speech acts and communication are to be fought.
This is also the spirit in which I will respond to Stokke. One of the rivals
to his theory is my own favored account of speech acts and communi-
cation – a view that I will call ‘intentionalism’. Stokke rejects this view on
the ground that it doesn’t fit with the ways that we normally think and
talk about lying and insincerity. My aim here is to respond on behalf of
intentionalism to this argumentative thread in Stokke’s book.
The main phenomenon that fuels Stokke’s objection to intentionalism is
bald-faced lying, which Stokke describes as a kind of lying that is not
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intended to deceive the addressee. After a brief overview of intentionalism
(Section 1), I will outline Stokke’s objection (Section 2). I will then explain
Stokke’s way of handling bald-faced lies (Section 3) and argue that it
doesn’t make sense of fleshed-out versions of some his own cases
(Section 4). I will then outline several strategies by means of which inten-
tionalists should respond to Stokke’s objection. First, I will argue that we
should give little weight to whether a speech act counts as an assertion
or a lie by the standard of ordinary usage, and that we should instead
seek theoretical roles for these concepts to play (Section 5). I will then
take a divide-and-conquer approach to putative examples of bald-faced
lies, arguing that they should be divided between at least three categories,
none of which poses a threat to intentionalism: some are irrational
attempts to deceive (Section 6), some are indirect speech acts (Section
7), and some are conventional acts (like the act of testifying in court)
rather than communicative acts (like assertion) (Section 8).
1. Intentionalism
Intentionalism is the view that humans communicate by revealing inten-
tions to change each other’s minds. To perform a communicative act is to
produce an utterance with a communicative intention – an intention to
have a psychological effect on one’s addressee in part by revealing to
them the intention to do so.1 Successful communication occurs if the
addressee recognizes what effect the speaker intended to have on them.
Actually producing the intended effect is a further kind of success.
The term ‘speaker’ is somewhat misleading. Communication needn’t
involve the use of language.2 I can perform a communicative act by
means of any overt behavior that, I think, could lead my addressee to
infer what I intend. Given the right circumstances, I can communicate
with a wink or by throwing my roommate’s possessions out the
window. What language adds to this picture is a means for encoding
and decoding richly structured evidence of communicative intentions,
and so a way of getting much more elaborate intentions recognized. Of
course, it normally wouldn’t make sense for me to produce any utterance
with any communicative intention I please. This follows from a broader
1This is what Grice (1969) called performing an act of ‘utterer’s occasion meaning’ and many others have
called ‘speaker(’s) meaning’. The term ‘communicative act’ originates with Strawson (1964) and Bach and
Harnish (1979). There are many variations on intentionalism, and I won’t attempt to speak on behalf of
all of them here.
2It is notable that seven of Gricef’s (1957) eight original examples of utterer’s meaning – what I am calling
‘performing a communicative act’ – are nonlinguistic. On this point, see Harris (2016, Section 5).
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fact about intentions, which is that it is irrational to intend something that
one takes to be impossible (Bratman 1987; Broome 1999).
A variety of different communicative acts can be understood in these
terms. I have elsewhere defended a simple version of intentionalism
that is due to Grice (1968, 1969).3 On this view, asserting p is a matter of
communicatively intending for one’s addressee to believe p. To direct
someone to f is to communicatively intend for them to form an intention
to f. To ask someone a question is to communicatively intend for them to
form an intention to answer it. According to intentionalists, performing
and interpreting communicative acts requires only the ability to act with
communicative intentions and recognize them in others. These abilities
rest on cognitive capacities for intention formation and mindreading
that are universal to normal human adults. Communicative acts are
among the basic instruments of human social cognition.
However, not all speech acts are communicative acts. For example, the
speech acts that figure in judicial and legislative proceedings, police con-
fessions, wedding ceremonies, and other ritualized social interactions
depend for their existence and success on much more than the cognitive
capacities of those involved. Their performance is made possible by facts
about the social conventions and institutions that are operative in the situ-
ations where they occur. In order for an utterance to count as a marriage
vow, for example, it must abide by all of the rules that govern marriage
vows in the relevant jurisdiction. In Nova Scotia, where I was married,
my vow had to include certain words in a certain order, in either English
or French (or, as it happened, a mix of both), uttered at the right point
in the ceremony, under the supervision of one of the few locals who
had been granted the legal power to officiate marriage ceremonies, and
so on. My marriage vow was a ‘conventional act’ – one whose conditions
of performance in a given jurisdiction are defined by that jurisdiction’s
social institutions and conventions. Communicative and conventional
acts are fundamentally different, and mustn’t be run together. This
requires care because of their superficial similarity.
2. Bald-faced lies
Stokke’s case against intentionalism revolves around bald-faced lies, which
he takes to be lies that the liar knows won’t deceive their addressees.
Stokke (2018, 18) adapts the following example from Carson (2006, 290):
3See, for example, Harris (2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b, 2020).
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The Cheating Student
A student accused of cheating on an exam is called to the Dean’s office. The
student knows that the Dean knows that she did in fact cheat. But as it is also
well known that the Dean will not punish someone unless they explicitly
admit their guilt, the student says,
(1) I didn’t cheat.
Stokke invites us to share his intuition that the student has lied in uttering
(1). To lie, Stokke argues, is to assert something that one doesn’t believe.4 It
follows that in uttering (1), the student asserted that they didn’t cheat. But,
Stokke argues, the student knows that they won’t convince the dean, and
so doesn’t intend to do so.
If Stokke’s argument is sound, then we have an assertion that isn’t
intended to make the addressee believe its content. This appears to be
a counterexample to the form of intentionalism that I wish to defend.
3. Stokke on lying, assertion, and common ground
Stokke’s solution to the problem of bald-faced lies is to adopt a theory of
assertion that, he thinks, allows him to classify bald-faced lies like (1) as
assertions. The theory that he adopts is originally due to Stalnaker
(1978). On this view, asserting p is a matter of proposing that p be
added to the conversation’s common ground.5 A proposition p is part of
a conversation’s common ground just in case the participants all accept
p for the purpose of the conversation, and commonly believe that they
do so (Stalnaker 2002, 716; Stokke 2018, 51). On Stalnaker’s account,
which Stokke accepts, it is possible to accept p for some purpose
without believing p (Stalnaker 1984, 79–81). To accept a proposition for
a given purpose is to treat it as true for that purpose, but not necessarily
for others. If p is in the common ground, then the participants in the con-
versation may felicitously presuppose p within the conversation, for
example, but they needn’t act on p when the conversation is over.
‘A person may accept something in one context, while rejecting it or sus-
pending judgment in another’, says Stalnaker (1984, 80): ‘There need be no
conflict that must be resolved when the difference is noticed, and he need
not change his mind when he moves from one context to the other’.
On Stokke’s view, all bald-faced lies are lies, and all lies are assertions. In
lying to the dean, the student aims to add the proposition that they didn’t
4This is a slight simplification of Stokke’s view.
5I am ignoring some irrelevant details of Stokke’s account.
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cheat to the common ground. Succeeding at this does not entail making
the dean believe the lie. It entails only that the dean accepts, for the
purpose of the conversation, that the student didn’t cheat – a much
easier goal to achieve. Stokke (2018, 52) motivates this way of thinking
about the case as follows.
The shared intuition about the case of the cheating student is that the reason
the student makes her utterance – despite the fact that both she and the
dean know full well that what she says is false – is that she wants to ‘go on
the record’. This idea lends itself readily to be explained in terms of the
common ground. Namely, to say that the student wants to go on the record
is just to say that the student wants it to be common ground that she did not
cheat.
If this account works, then it allows Stokke to maintain that the student
asserted that he didn’t cheat, and thereby lied.
4. An objection to Stokke’s account
Stokke’s theory conflicts with the kind of intentionalism that I outlined in
Section 1, since it gives up on the idea that genuine assertions are
intended to change addressees’ beliefs. I have elsewhere argued that
common-ground-centric accounts of assertion and other speech acts
don’t work, and that the kind of intentionalism that I outlined in Section
1 is to be preferred.6 So I am not inclined to go along with Stokke’s
account.
I also think that there is a serious problem with Stokke’s way of account-
ing for bald-faced lies. In the case at hand, Stokke conflates two different
purposes for which the dean can accept the proposition that the student
didn’t cheat. It is one thing for the dean to treat this proposition as true for
the purpose of the conversation, as he would have to in order for the prop-
osition to be common ground. It is another thing for the dean to treat it
has true for official disciplinary purposes. The latter – an extra-conversa-
tional matter – is what the student really cares about, and is what explains
why they perform the speech act that they perform.
Consider one way that the student’s conversation with the dean could
play out:
6In Harris (2017), I argue that common-ground-centric theories of speech acts collapse categories of
speech acts that should be distinguished. In Harris (2020), I argue that we can communicate without
changing the common ground and without intending (or proposing) to change it, and that common
ground should be thought of as an artifact of idealized models of conversation rather than as part of
the phenomenon of communication itself.
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STUDENT: I didn’t cheat.
DEAN: That’s false and you and I both know it. But I am not going to punish you
since you haven’t confessed. You’ll just have to live with your guilt.
Let p be the proposition that the student didn’t cheat. From the dean’s
response, we can see that the student’s utterance not only hasn’t con-
vinced the dean to believe p; it hasn’t led the dean to accept p for the
purpose of their conversation, either. He comes right out and says that
p is false, after all. If their conversation continues, it would be infelicitous
for either the student or the dean to presuppose p.
If we take the student to have been asserting p, then their speech act
was a failure. But even in this extension of Stokke’s scenario, the speech
act wasn’t a failure; it was a success. The student, we can reasonably
suppose, doesn’t care about how the conversation goes; they care
about whether they will be punished. That is an extra-conversational
goal – one whose accomplishment depends on how the student’s utter-
ance interacts with the dean’s policy about punishment and confession,
not on how the dean responds within the conversation. Put a different
way, the student doesn’t care whether the dean treats p as true for the pur-
poses of the conversation; the student just wants the dean to treat p as true
for official disciplinary purposes. And these two ways of accepting p as true
can come apart. Achieving the former would, according to Stokke, be part
of the aim of asserting p. But it is the achievement of the latter that is the
student’s intention. If so, then the student wasn’t really performing an
assertion at all, at least by Stokke’s lights.
So, what speech act did the student perform, if not an assertion? I will
consider two answers to this question in Sections 7–8. First, I will lay out
some other parts of what I think the intentionalist should say about
bald-faced lies in general.
5. What are we trying to accomplish here?
A crucial premise in Stokke’s argument is that bald-faced lies are lies. One
person who has rejected this premise is Dynel (2011), who contends that
‘the folk term ‘bald-faced lie’ should not be mistakenly equated with the
concept of a lie approached theoretically’ (151). Stokke’s response is
that Dynel runs afoul of ordinary usage:7
7Stokke also responds to Dynel by pointing out that ‘no sensible theories of lying propose to equate the
terms “bald-faced lie” and “lie”’, since ‘any sensible theory must acknowledge the datum that many lies
are deceptive lies’. True enough, but I doubt that Dynel can be charitably understood as accusing anyone
of making that mistake.
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Furthermore, it is implausible to claim that the student merely lied in some loose
sense of to lie. Rather, it is the insistence that the student did not lie that relies on
a non-standard sense of the word. If one wants to deny that bald-faced lies are
lies, one will be forced to admit that one is confining one’s notion of lying to a
subclass of what we ordinarily take to be lies. (Stokke 2018, 21)
In other words, it is unintuitive, or contrary to the way that we would ordi-
narily use the verb, ‘to lie’, to say that bald-faced lies aren’t lies.
I won’t try to dispute Stokke’s intuition. But I doubt that it should
carry much weight. Doesn’t the methodology of testing definitions
against intuitive judgments presuppose that our aim is to analyze
the ordinary concept of lying? Haven’t all past attempts to analyze
ordinary concepts ended in dismal failure?8 Why should we be particu-
larly interested in our ordinary way of thinking about lying anyway?
Couldn’t our ordinary concept turn out to be inconsistent, or in need
of significant revision, or at least missing some theoretically important
nuance?
In the last section, I also suggested that some of the speech acts that
ordinarily get classified as bald-faced lies aren’t assertions, and I will be
defending this claim later. One could try to respond to this claim in the
same way that Stokke responds to Dynel – by saying that my sugges-
tion flies in the face of our ordinary concept of assertion. But I think
that adherence to ordinary usage should be even less appealing in
this case. After all, the verb ‘to assert’ and its cognates barely show
up in ordinary, non-philosophical English, and don’t bare much relation
to the various philosophical notions of assertion when they do. ‘Asser-
tion’ is an unabashed technical term. And so the goal of capturing
ordinary usage seems particularly out of place when it comes to
assertion.
All of this raises a methodological question: If our goal when giving the-
ories of lying and assertion should not be to analyze ordinary concepts,
what should it be? And how should this affect our methodology?
In the case of assertion, I think that there is a relatively clear answer
to these questions. On my view, assertion is a theoretical posit that
earns its keep by playing a role in a theory of human communication.
I take the best theory of at least much human communication to be
the sort of intentionalism that I outlined in Section 1. In particular, I
think that we often seek to change others’ beliefs, and that a powerful
8For a more belabored version of this point, see Fodor (1998, Chap. 3–4). For an amusing illustration invol-
ving the concept chair, see Elbourne (2011).
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and flexible way of accomplishing this is to offer them evidence that we
intend to do so, banking on the assumption that this will give them a
reason to change their mind accordingly. This is what I call ‘assertion’.
To justify this account of assertion, I would have to give reasons to
think that the overall theory in which it is embedded is a good
account of human communication. Of course, this does not preclude
the possibility that there are other interesting concepts of assertion
that might play valuable roles in other theories. Mathematicians some-
times call the lines of proofs that they endorse ‘assertions’, for example,
and I have no problem with this additional technical usage. Homonymy
and polysemy pose no problem so long as we don’t let them confuse
us. Whether or not either of these technical uses lines up with the ordin-
ary way that we use the verb, ‘to assert’ (insofar as we use it at all) is
beside the point.
In order to carry this methodology over to the concept of lying, we
would need to know which theoretical enterprise(s) a theory of lying
seeks to contribute to. There are various possibilities. Perhaps our
ancestors’ capacity for lying played an important role in the evolution
of the human mind, and so we need to figure out the right concept
of lying in order to articulate the biological functions of some of our
cognitive capacities.9 Alternatively, we might need a concept of lying
to play a role in an ethical theory that seeks to specify which actions
are permissible. Perhaps we need concepts of lying for both of these
purposes.
But some caveats are in order. First, I see no reason to assume in
advance that all such inquiries will require the same concept of lying,
any more than a theory of human communication and theory of math-
ematical proofs will converge on the same concept of assertion. Second,
the concept of lying has to earn its keep in these inquiries. If it turns out
that all of the important normative distinctions can be made using a
broader concept of dishonesty, for example, then it may be that lying
just isn’t an interesting concept for the purposes of normative theorizing.10
Third, and most importantly for present purposes, it may turn out that the
concept of lying that best plays a given theoretical role is one whose
extension excludes some or all of what we would normally call ‘bald-
faced lies’. In fact, I think that this is quite plausible. Consider the
concept of lying that we might want to play a role in normative ethics.
9See, for example, Trivers (2011).
10For an argument for this claim, see Barber (2020).
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There seem to be important normative differences between deceptive lies
and bald-faced lies. Successful deceptive lies spread falsehood and disin-
formation but successful bald-faced lies do not. We therefore have
different reasons for disapproving of them, and different responses to
them might be warranted. From the point of a consequentialist normative
theory on which we have a particular interest in understanding which
actions promote true belief and which promote misinformation, we
might not want to lump deceptive lies and bald-faced lies together in a
single category. Likewise, a Kantian ethicist who locates the wrong of
lying in the intent to deceive might have theoretical use for a concept
of lies that does not include bald-faced lies.
Again, the fact that these concepts of lying might run afoul of ordinary
usage is beside the point. A concept of lying that does important theoreti-
cal work for us might turn out not to fit with ordinary usage, but then again
it might not. Many concepts that have turned out to be indispensable for
the purposes of scientific and normative theorizing bear little relation to
ordinary usage. Is there any reason to expect that the concept of lying
will be exceptional in this regard?11
6. Some bald-faced lies are irrational attempts to deceive
Keeping the methodological detour of the last section in mind, let’s turn to
the question of what an intentionalist should say about various speech
acts that we would normally classify as bald-faced lies. The first possibility
that I want to explore is that some bald-faced liars intend to deceive even
though they believe that they can’t succeed.
Stokke rules out this possibility with the following principle.
Belief-Intention Constraint
A intends to f only if A believes that she can f. (Stokke 2018, 25)
If this principle is correct, then it is not possible to believe that one can’t
deceive someone and intend to do so anyway. Stokke presumably
thinks that there is something about the nature of belief and intention
that makes this combination of attitudes impossible.
11I anticipate that some, having read this section, will accuse me of hypocracy. Isn’t intentionalism itself the
project of analyzing concepts likemeaning by testing definitions against intuitions and ordinary usage? I
think this charge is accurate when directed against some of the founding documents of intentionalism,
such as Grice (1957, 1969) and Schiffer (1972). However, I have elsewhere criticized early intentionalists’
methodology and defended an alternative approach for precisely this reason (Harris 2019b). Intention-
alism, I argue, should be construed as an empirical theory of the cognitive capacities underlying human
communication, not as a project in conceptual analysis.
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I think that Stokke is wrong about this, and I reject his principle. In its
place, I think we should adopt the following principle:
Belief-Intention Constraint on Rationality
If A intends to f and A’s beliefs rule out the possibility that A will f, then A’s
mental state is in this respect irrational.
On this version of the principle, it is not impossible but merely irrational to
intend to do what one believes to be impossible. I am not alone in prefer-
ring to think of this constraint as a rational requirement rather than a
metaphysical requirement. Versions stated in terms of rationality have
been explicitly defended by Bratman (1987), Broome (1999, 2013), and
Holton (2011), among others.
I won’t try to defend this view, except to say that it makes good sense of
some problem cases. For example, Wilson and Sperber (1988, 213) imagine
someone who shouts ‘Start, damn you!’ at a car that isn’t working. The
speaker knows that their utterance won’t change the car’s intentions:
cars don’t have minds. So what is going on? We could try to use this
case to motivate a radical revision to our theory of speech acts. But
there is a much simpler solution, which is to say that the speaker was
suffering from a momentary bout of irrationality when they shouted at
their car. Presumably, if we asked the speaker about the episode later,
they would agree that their shouting was irrational. So I recommend
that we say of such cases that the speaker momentarily forms a commu-
nicative intention that conflicts with what they believe.12
I think that some bald-faced lies are irrational actions in the foregoing
sense. They are intended to accomplish something that the speaker
believes is impossible. This seems like a good way to describe a child
who insists that they didn’t hit their sibling immediately after their
parents watched them do it, for example. It is also the best way to make
sense of Stokke’s (2018, 55) example of an obviously drunk person who
insists that they haven’t been drinking.13 However, I don’t think it’s best
to think of all bald-faced lies in this way. In particular, there doesn’t
seem to be anything irrational about the student’s lie to the dean: the stu-
dent’s goal is to avoid punishment, and they correctly believe that they
can accomplish this goal by uttering (1).
12There is even some empirical evidence for this way of thinking about the case. Cognitive scientists have
shown that we tend to anthropomorphize inanimate objects more often when they violate our expec-
tations, such as when they malfunction (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007). Mandelbaum and Ripley
(2012, 364) argue, for example, that we are much more likely to anthropomorphize a car if it breaks down.
13Another possibility about the child and the drunk is that they have momentarily come to believe – pre-
sumably also irrationally – that their lie will be convincing.
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7. Some bald-faced lies are indirect speech acts
How, then, should we characterize the student’s speech act? I will consider
two theoretical options, each of which, I think, helps us to understand
some bald-faced lies. The first is that some of what we call bald-faced
lies are actually indirect speech acts, wherein the speaker makes as if to
assert something in order to indirectly accomplish some other conversa-
tional goal.
The idea that we sometimes make as if to perform one speech act in
order to indirectly perform another should be familiar from Grice’s
(1975) theory of implicature. Grice distinguishes between two ways of
implicating something. First, one can implicate p by saying q, in which
case one means both p and q. As an example, Grice describes a case in
which A says to B, ‘I am out of petrol’, and B replies, ‘There is a garage
around the corner’, thereby implicating that the garage is open and has
gas available (1989, 32). The speaker’s implicature is not a replacement
for what they appear to say in this case, it is an additional message.
Second, one can implicate q by merely making as if to say p, in which
case one only means q but not p. Grice’s examples of this kind involve
metaphor, hyperbole, and irony, such as his case in which a speaker
describes a man who has recently betrayed them as ‘a find friend’,
thereby implicating that he is anything but (1989, 34). Here, the speaker
does not mean that the man in question is both a fine friend and also a
bad friend, but only the latter: the implicature is intended to supplant
what the speaker makes as if to say, not supplement it.
The mechanism at work here is straightforward: The speaker makes an
utterance that would be uncooperative if taken literally, and this leads the
addressee to the conclusion that the speaker intended something other
than what their words would normally indicate. If I were to tell you that
X is a fine friend in a context where we both know that X has betrayed
me, I would violate the maxim of quality, since I would be asserting some-
thing that we both take to be false. I anticipate that you will take me to be
cooperative, and so assume that I am merely flouting the maxim of quality
in order to hint at what I really mean, which is that X is a terrible friend.
Here, the cooperative principle together with your extralinguistic evidence
about my state of mind defeat the linguistic evidence that I give you,
which is exactly my plan.
Most of Grice’s examples of implicating by making as if to say, including
those involving metaphor, hyperbole, and irony, involve flouting the
maxim of quality. They all involve utterances that, if taken literally,
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would indicate that the speaker is saying something that neither the
speaker nor the addressee believes, and that the speaker therefore
obviously has no chance of getting the addressee to believe. I think that
a lot of what we normally call ‘bald-faced lies’ are like this too. By uttering
something that is obviously false, and that would be obviously uncoopera-
tive if taken literally, the speaker manages to flout the maxim of quality
and indirectly communicate something else.
What are these bald-faced liars really trying to communicate? I doubt
that we can answer this question with any more generality than we can
say, in general, what sorts of things are communicated ironically or meta-
phorically. We can communicate many things indirectly, and if bald-
faced lies are mechanisms of indirect communication, we should
expect them to be versatile. Nevertheless, we can consider some plaus-
ible examples.
Here is one common kind of case: A asks B a question, knowing that the
answer is p. The reason that they do this is because the truth of p should
prompt a certain further response by B. In response to A’s question, B bald-
facedly answers with something other than p. B does this as a way of
indirectly refusing to respond in the way that A was expecting to follow
from p.
Ann and Bob have divided up the chores. Bob’s job is to mow the lawn at 2 p.m.
At 2:05, Bob is still playing a video game. The following exchange unfolds:
(2) Ann: What time is it Bob?
Bob: Oh, it’s about 1:45.
Let’s suppose that it’s completely obvious that it is after 2 p.m., and so Bob
can’t be (rationally) attempting to deceive Ann. And let’s suppose that he’s
not irrationally attempting to deceive her. In that case, his most plausible
real aim is to indirectly inform her that he’s not going to start mowing the
lawn quite yet (and perhaps to rub it in her face that she can’t make him).
We can say something similar about Meibauer’s (2014) example of a
husband who says to his wife, ‘I slept in my office last night’, when it is
obvious that he was with another woman. Assuming that the husband
really does take it to be impossible to deceive his wife, and that he isn’t
speaking with an irrational intention to deceive her, we are left with the
question of what he takes the point of his utterance to be. A plausible
answer, at least on some ways of fleshing out the case, is that he wishes
to communicate that he feels no need to apologize or admit guilt, that
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he has no intention of talking about it further, and that he thinks that his
wife has no way of holding him accountable.14
Finally, I think this is one plausible explanation of what the student is
doing when he appears to deny cheating by uttering (1). Assuming that
he really is certain that he won’t deceive the dean, and that he thinks
that the dean knows that he knows about the dean’s unofficial policy of
only punishing those who confess, the student might utter (1) as a way
of indirectly communicating that he is not planning to confess and that
the dean should not expect him to.
I hesitate to definitively conclude that this is the best explanation of the
student’s utterance, both because the case is not very thoroughly
described and because I think there is one more possibility worth taking
seriously (see Section 8), but I am convinced that many bald-faced lies
are best understood this way.
8. Some bald-faced lies are conventional acts
It is a central claim of Stokke’s theory that lies are always assertions (Stokke
2018, 31, Chap. 3). I think there are good reasons to disagree. Suppose that
we ignore my protests in Section 5 and adhere to ordinary usage about
what counts as a lie. Here, I want to argue that when we attend to the
theoretically important properties of speech acts, we find that many
things that ordinary usage deems to be lies are not assertions. My
reason is that assertion is a communicative act but many intuitive
examples of lies, including bald-faced lies, are done by means of conven-
tional acts.
This point is similar to one made by Keiser (2016), and I will illustrate it
by expanding on an example first used by her.15 In The Godfather: Part II,
Frank Pentangeli has turned state’s witness against his former boss,
Michael Corleone. He has signed a sworn affidavit saying that Corleone
is head of a crime syndicate and has ordered Pentangeli to commit
murder. There is a good deal of other circumstantial evidence for these
14Meibauer’s own explanation of this case is that the husband is violating the maxim of quality as a way of
showing his wife that he is uncooperative, thereby insulting her. I think that this is a plausible account of
some bald-faced lies as well and that Meibauer’s example is too underdescribed to decide between my
account and his.
15My terminology and some of my theoretical background differ from those of Keiser. Instead of dis-
tinguishing between communicative and conventional acts, Keiser distinguishes between ‘illocutionary
actions’ and speech acts that are not genuine illocutionary actions. As she uses this terminology, I believe
she cross-cuts the communicative–conventional distinction in some ways. However, Keiser and I agree
on enough core cases that her distinction winds up figuring in her argument in much the same way that
the communicative–conventional distinction figures in mine.
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claims. The contents of Pentangeli’s affidavit are, let us suppose, common
knowledge among the authorities. Still, the law dictates that Pentangeli
must actually testify before a senate hearing before Corleone can be
charged with a crime. At the last moment, the Corleones manage to
locate Pentangeli’s brother, Vincenzo, and bring him from Sicily to
America. Seeing his brother sitting with the Corleones in court, Pentangeli
becomes ashamed and afraid for his family and decides to change his tes-
timony, which then plays out as follows:
SENATOR KANE: Mr. Pentangeli, were you a member of the Corleone family? Did
you serve under caporegime Peter Clemenza, under Vito Corleone, also
known as the Godfather?
PENTANGELI: I never…I never knew no Godfather. I have my own family, Senator.
SENATOR KANE: Mr. Pentangeli, you are contradicting a sworn statement you pre-
viously made to me and signed. I ask you again, sir, here and now under oath:
were you at any time a member of a crime organization headed by Michael Cor-
leone?
PENTANGELI: I don’t know nothing about that! Oh…I was in the olive-oil business
with his father, but that was a long time ago, that’s all.
SENATOR KANE: We have a sworn affidavit! We have it – your sworn affidavit, that
you murdered on the orders of Michael Corleone. Do you deny this confession?
Do you realize what will happen as a result of your denial?
PENTANGELI: Look, the FBI guys, they promised me a deal. So I made up a lot of
stuff about Michael Corleone, cuz that’s what they wanted. But it was all lies –
uh – everything!…
Pentangeli utters his answers in an unserious tone, making it obvious that
he is not testifying in good faith. The senators’ reactions make it clear that
Pentangeli’s utterances have not changed anyone’s beliefs about his role
in the mafia. Nor do the senators go on to treat Pentangeli’s testimony as
true for the purposes of the conversation. One senator shouts ‘I’m going to
get to the bottom of this!’, for example. It is implausible that Pentangeli’s
aim was to make anyone believe or accept any of what he said, and we do
no harm to the film’s plot by assuming that it was not.
Intuitively, Pentangeli’s utterances are lies, and bald-faced lies. Should
we conclude that his utterances are also assertions, and that asserting a
proposition p therefore needn’t be aimed at making anyone believe p,
or even at making anyone accept p for the purposes of the conversation?
I think that this would be the wrong conclusion to draw. Instead, we
should recognize that legal testimony is a fundamentally different kind
of speech act than assertion, but nonetheless one that can count as a lie
by the standards of ordinary usage.
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The very possibility of testifying in court depends on an elaborate
system of institutions and procedural conventions that vary by jurisdiction.
These institutions and conventions define the conditions under which tes-
timony is possible in the relevant jurisdiction and the effects that it will
have there. In some jurisdictions, a person can perform the act of testifying
in court only if they have been sworn in as a witness, only if people occu-
pying the right roles (judge, jury, prosecutor, etc.) are present, and only if a
host of other background conditions obtain. The aim of sharing infor-
mation or changing people’s beliefs is often incidental to the purpose of
legal testimony. We can imagine a witness who has previously asserted
all of the contents of their testimony out on the courthouse steps, with
all of the same people listening, immediately before testifying. The con-
tents of their testimony could be common knowledge to everyone
present. This would in no way diminish the purpose of their testimony.
The point of testimony is to put some information on the court record,
and one does this not by communicating with anyone but by playing a
role in a social ritual – what Austin (1962) called a ‘conventional
procedure’.
By its nature, legal testimony always invokes a specific set of social insti-
tutions and conventions. Assertion does not work this way – not according
to the intentionalist account of assertion, and not according to Stokke’s
own account of assertion either. Assertion needn’t be performed within
any particular jurisdiction, and its nature and performance conditions do
not vary between jurisdictions. Assertion is part of the basic repertoire
of human social interaction, not a move in a social ritual whose nature is
constituted by localized conventions. Although testifying in court may
involve making noises that are similar to those that one would make in
performing assertions, they are fundamentally different speech acts.
I think that this point can be extended to the student’s lie to the dean.
The student, like Pentangeli, is not motivated by the aim of changing
anyone’s mind. Rather, the student’s aim is to do whatever it takes to
avoid punishment. The dean has a policy of not punishing anyone who
doesn’t confess. Knowing this, the student utters the magic words, with
little concern for any other effects that their action might have. The
student is doing essentially the same kind of thing as Pentangeli, albeit
in a less formal or consequential setting.16
I anticipate the following objection: Although it’s true that the dean has
a policy of punishing students only if they explicitly confess, this policy is
16Cf. Keiser (2016, 471–472).
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(let us suppose) an informal one, and not part of the school’s official rules.
This makes the situation different than Pentangeli’s senate hearing, where
the procedural intricacies are explicit and clear.
But I don’t think that this difference matters. It is a well-worn point in
the philosophy of law that an institution’s rules needn’t be written down
anywhere in order to be binding. Common-law systems give us one
example, as does the unwritten convention at the foundation of the U.S.
legal system that the U.S. Constitution is a legally binding document but
the Declaration of Independence isn’t.17 Some societies have no formal
means of making their rules explicit, but this does not mean that they
lack laws, social institutions, or rituals in which conventional speech acts
may figure. My argument in this section depends only on treating the
dean’s policy as a de facto institutional fact – one that the student can
exploit by uttering the right words in the right context, thereby performing
a conventional act of denying guilt. The student’s knowledge of this social
affordance is what explains their utterance. Like Frank Pentangeli’s testi-
mony, the student’s speech act is intuitively a lie, and a bald-faced lie;
but to infer from this that it is best understood as an assertion in anything
like the usual sense is to ignore theoretical distinctions without which we
have little hope of understanding the student’s actions. To label the stu-
dent’s speech act an assertion is to commit what Austin (1962, 3) calls
the ‘descriptive fallacy’.
9. Conclusion
I have argued that some of what we normally call ‘bald-faced lies’ are
irrational attempts to deceive and others are speech acts that superficially
resemble assertions but are actually of fundamentally different kinds. Bald-
faced lies in these categories pose no threat to intentionalism. By contrast,
Stokke’s own account of bald-faced lies struggles to make sense of elabo-
rated versions of his own examples.
A theme in the foregoing has been that speech acts are too complex
and varied to be entrusted to our ordinary ways of talking about them.
Even if conceptual analysis were possible (which I doubt!), the recapitula-
tion of our folk categories that would result would ignore deep and impor-
tant distinctions. What’s needed is careful theoretical sensitivity to the
ways in which different speech acts fit into our broader aims and activities,
and to the psychological and social mechanisms by which they play these
17These points are originally due to Hart (1994).
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roles. This approach is likely to explode folk categories like lying, leaving us
with a collection of successor concepts that fit into our different theoretical
pursuits in different ways. So be it. This is one kind of philosophical
progress.
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